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I. INTRODUCTION
"In addition to any other limitation under law, recovery of medical or
health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or
incurred on behalf of the claimant."'
The solitary sentence above, which is the entirety of section 41.0105 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, has wreaked havoc among
personal-injury practitioners and the courts considering their cases since it
went into effect on September 1, 2003. In that time, many practitioners and
academics have written articles that debate the meaning of the statute and
its effect on litigation.2 In 2011, the Texas Supreme Court stepped in,
ostensibly to silence the debate about interpreting section 41.0105, with its
detailed opinion in Haygood v. De Escabedo.3 Unfortunately, Haygood raised as
many questions as it answered, and in its wake, practitioners and academics
have again extensively debated the language of section 41.0105 and its
intended effect.4
1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (West 2016).
2. See April Y. Quifiones, Comment, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code i 41.0105: A Time for
Clarification, 42 ST. MARY'S L.J. 551, 593 (2011) (noting unclear and conflicting Texas case law on
section 41.0105 has created confusion and inequity for personal injury claimants); see also Blake Hatem,
Comment, A Dysfunctional Statute and Its 'Plain Meaning" I ll Off the Collateral Source Rule in Texas, 51 S.
TEX. L. REV. 229, 257 (2009) ("([A]s interpreted, [Section 41.0105] also represents a limit to general
economic damages that could have far reaching consequences for Texas's tort system.");
Jim M. Perdue, Jr., Maybe It Depends on What Your Definition of "Or"Is?-A HolisticApproach to Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code if 41.0105, the CollateralSource Rule, and Legislaive History, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV.
241,269 (2006) ("Courts must apply a full legislative analysis so that the fairness of the collateral source
rule is preserved in Texas law .... In doing so, a more reasonable and moderate interpretation is readily
available for Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 41.0105.').
3. Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011).
4. See Seth Burt, Note and Comment, No Medical Insurance? Hy That's Good for Phiniffs: A
Defendant's Anasis ofHaygood v. Escabedo, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 446 (2014) C'Haygood held open
the door to drastically disparate recoveries among plaintiffs based on his or her insurance coverage.
When confronted with an uninsured plaintiff, defendants must be aware of the convoluted and
complicated medical billing practices to construct a valid and persuasive unreasonableness argument.");
see alsoJamee Cotton, Comment, How Much Are You Worth? Why the Texas Supreme Court Took Tort Reform
Too Far in limiting the Admissibi,'y of Certain Medical Expenses During Trial, 45 TEx. TECH L. REV. 565,
602 (2013) ("Without action by the legislature, neither claimants nor defendants will receive the just
[Vol. 48:179
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The present article will add nothing substantive to that debate. Rather,
this Article is intended as an objective look at a related issue that was not
before the Texas Supreme Court in Haygood-medical factoring-and the
ways it will likely affect personal-injury litigation across Texas. To date, only
one intermediate court of appeals has taken up the issue of medical factoring
under Haygood, and this Article will examine that court's opinion before
giving a brief overview of related cases in other appellate courts. The Article
will end with a call to the Texas Supreme Court to take up this important
question of state law.
I1. SETTING THE SCENE
To understand the issues surrounding medical factoring and its effect on
personal-injury practice, a summary of Haygood and a primer on the practice
of factoring in general and medical factoring in particular is necessary.
A. Haygood v. De Escabedo
"Accordingly, we hold that section 41.0105 limits a claimant's recovery
of medical expenses to those which have been or must be paid by or for the
claimant."
5
As mentioned above, practitioners and academics have written prolifically
on the meaning and effect of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Haygood.6 For our purposes, then, a brief summary is all that is required.
Aaron Glenn Haygood was injured when the car he was driving collided
with a minivan driven by Margarita Garza de Escabedo.7 Twelve medical
providers billed Haygood a total of $110,069.12 for treatment that included
surgeries on his neck and shoulder.8 Because Haygood was covered by
Medicare Part B, his medical providers adjusted his bills downward to
$27,739.43, the cost that Medicare determined to be reasonable.9 At the
result they deserve, and the system will again create an imbalanced scheme.'); Robert W. Painter, Paid
or Incurred, Post-Haygood v. Escabedo, HOUS. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 45, 46, https://issuu.com/
leosur/docs/thl_sepoct_2011/1 (discussing how the impact of Haygood has left trial lawyers on either
side to contemplate how their daily practice will be affected).
5. Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 398 (Tex. 2011).
6. See Burt, supra note 4, at 446 ("Haygood held open the door to drastically disparate recoveries
among plaintiffs based on his or her insurance coverage. When confronted with an uninsured plaintiff,
defendants must be aware of the convoluted and complicated medical billing practices to construct a
valid and persuasive unreasonableness argument."); see also Cotton, supra note 4, at 602; Painter, supra
note 4, at 45 (discussing how the impact of Haygood has left trial lawyers on either side to contemplate
how their daily practice will be affected).
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time of trial, $13,257.41 had been paid, but $14,482.02 remained due.'
Each party attempted to exclude certain evidence related to medical
expenses. Escabedo moved under section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code to exclude evidence of any medical bills "other
than those paid or owed."'1 1 Haygood moved under the collateral source
rule to exclude evidence of anything other than the medical expenses that
had been billed-effectively attempting to exclude evidence that his bills
had been reduced by $82,329.69 as a result of his Medicare coverage.
1 2
In analyzing the issue, the Texas Supreme Court noted that section
41.0105 was enacted by the Legislature "against a backdrop of health care
pricing practices and the collateral source rule."'13 The modern practice of
medical providers is to charge "list" rates to uninsured patients who
frequently fail to pay them and to charge significantly lower rates for patients
covered by government or medical insurance.4 The court noted the
collateral source rule, which prevents reductions in a tortfeasor's liability
because of benefits a plaintiff received from someone else, was an
established part of Texas common law.' However, the court rejected
Haygood's claim that the collateral source rule precluded evidence of
reductions in medical bills related to insurance.1 6 It reasoned:
The collateral source rule reflects "the position of the law that a benefit
that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a
windfall for the tortfeasor." To impose liability for medical expenses that a
health care provider is not entitled to charge does not prevent a windfall to a
tortfeasor; it creates one for a claimant ... "17
In that context, the court examined section 41.0105 and concluded it
allows for the recovery only of "expenses that have been or will be paid[]




13. Id. at 392-93.
14. See id. at 394 (describing how patients are commonly billed at list rates). Indeed, the list rates
"are generally at least double" and occasionally up to eight times the rates that would be accepted from
government or private insurers. George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctnne of Unconsdonabili y
and Hospital Bilng of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 104 (2005).
15. Hvgood, 356 S.W.3d at 394-95 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 395.
17. Id. (first quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. B (AM. LAW. INST. 1979);
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provider bills but has no right to be paid."1 8
B. Factoring
"Factoring," a noun, has been defined as follows: "The buying of
accounts receivable at a discount. The price is discounted because the factor
(who buys them) assumes the risk of delay in collection and loss on the
accounts receivable."'
9
Factoring is what happens when one business has a right to collect
money, and it sells that right-at a discount-to another business before
the money has been paid.2" In some form or another, factoring can be
traced back 5000 years to the Babylonians.2 1 More recently, the nationwide
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code spurred its widespread use,
often under the name "accounts receivable financing."2 2 A law review note
from the early 1950s explains the general process:
Accounts receivable financing begins when the borrower presents the factor
with a schedule of accounts payable at specified intervals, usually thirty, sixty,
or ninety days, together with copies of the invoice for each account. After
investigating the borrower, his business[,] and the particular invoices, the
factor will calculate a value, or "aging," for the accounts, usually expressed in
terms of a percentage of their face value. The loan will also be a certain
percentage of face value, known as the "rate of advance." As accounts
become due, the borrower collects the checks paid by the account debtors and
sends them to the factor at intervals depending upon the volume of sales. It
is not uncommon for the borrower to remit checks daily.
23
Little has changed since then.2 4 Factoring continues to be "a financing
tool that reduces the amount of working capital a business needs by
18. Haygood, 356 S.W.3d at 396-97.
19. Factoing, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (10th ed. 2014).
20. Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. City of Wharton, 101 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1 st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
21. See NOEL RUDDY ET AL., SALINGER ON FACTORING 5 (4th ed. 2006) (stating the practice of
debt-selling has been long-established and some historical writers on factoring have traced it back to
Babylonian times).
22. See id. at 5, 8, 11 ("Mt is significant that since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
by most states in the 1950s factoring and, in particular, 'accounts receivable financing' has increased
rapidly .... This trend has appeared to continue.").
23. Note, PokcingAccounts Receivable and Inventory UnderModern Factor's Legislation, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
392, 392-93 (1952).
24. See, e.g., Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 601 n.4 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (citing Note, Polcing Accounts Receivable and Inventogy Under Modern Factor's
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reducing the delay between the time of sale and the receipt of payment.",25
Medical factoring companies are a subset of factoring companies that deal
in the accounts receivable of medical providers.26 These companies are
particularly important because medical treatment generates significant bills,
and payment of those bills is often delayed.27 When medical treatment
arises out of a plaintiffs third-party liability claims, medical factoring
companies customarily purchase the relevant medical bills from the medical
providers.
28
Section 41.0105 and tort reform in general came about long after medical
factoring was a common practice in Texas.2 9 In Haygood, however, the
Texas Supreme Court did not decide the effect of factoring on section
41.0105,3o but rather limited its analysis to the effect of insurance pricing
schemes.3 Accordingly, it has been unclear what amount of damages could
be recovered by Texas plaintiffs whose medical bills were sold to factoring
companies at a discount.32 There are two possibilities: (1) the full amount
billed or (2) the discounted amount the factoring company paid to the
medical provider.
33
For an uninsured plaintiff whose medical bills were bought by "Factoring
CO.," the arrangement could look like this:
34
25. Hous. Ligbing &Power Co., 101 S.W.3d at 636.
26. See Galaviz v. C.R. Eng., Inc., No. A-12-MC-82 LY., 2012 WL 1313301, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 17, 2012) (describing an entity as a medical factoring company, and explaining such companies
typically purchase medical providers' medical bills at a discounted rate).
27. Brief for Texas Trial Lawyers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 3, Huston v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (No. 01-
12-00387-CV).
28. Galavi:, 2012 WL 1313301, at *1 n.1.
29. M. Colby Lewis, Collateral Source Rule: A Look into Plaintiffs' Creaive Ways Around Tort Reform, in
HARMONIE GROUP, 2015 TRANSPORTATION SEMINAR 34, 38 (2015).
30. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. denied).
31. Lewis, supra note 29, at 38.
32. See general#y id. at 39 (illustrating how factoring companies work with hospitals and plaintiffs).
33. See Huston v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. denied) (following Hagood and limiting "a plaintiffs recovery to the amount that the medical
providers have a right to be paid") (emphasis in original).
34. Lewis, supra note 29, at 39.
[Vol. 48:179
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Contract A allows the hospital to avoid delay in receiving payment for
plaintiff's medical bills, which Factoring CO. buys at a discounted rate to
account for that delay and possible non-payment-a classic factoring
arrangement.
35
Contract B is more interesting for purposes of the present Article.
Nationally, less than five percent of uninsured patients actually pay the full
amount billed by medical providers.36 In Haygood, the Texas Supreme Court
admitted that the full amounts charged to uninsured patients are "frequently
uncollected."3" Against that backdrop, why would an uninsured plaintiff
agree to be liable for the full amount billed? The answer may depend on
who you ask.
Defense attorneys argue that the reason for Contract B is a third,
unwritten contract-Contract C-that establishes the true amount
Factoring CO. will accept as full payment from Plaintiff.38 By setting an
expected payment amount lower than the full amount billed, Contract C
allows Plaintiff to frustrate tort-reform efforts and increase his recovery
beyond the medical expenses actually paid or incurred on his behalf.
39
Plaintiffs' attorneys vehemently deny the existence of Contract C.
40
Instead, they argue that Plaintiff accepts the obligation to pay the full
amount--Contract B-because it is one of the only ways to pay for
35. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 630 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "factoring" as
"[tihe buying of accounts receivable at a discount"); NOEL RUDDY ET AL., supra note 21, at 1-2 (4th
ed. 2006) (explaining what a business needs to assess before entering into a factoring agreement).
36. Nation, supra note 14, at 104.
37. Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 393 (Tex. 2011).
38. Lewis, supra note 29, at 40.
39. Id. at 39.
40. See Texas Trial Lawyers Ass'n, supra note 27, at 26 ("To portray what AR/Net[, a medical
factoring company,] does as some reaction to circumvent tort reform is inaccurate] given that this
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desperately needed medical care.41
The reasoning behind Contract B is less important than its practical
effect. When the Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently became the first
appellate court in Texas to directly address the effect of factoring companies
on the recovery of medical expenses, that effect was made clear: A plaintiff
who agrees to pay the full amount billed may introduce evidence of that full
amount under section 41.0105.42
III. ONE CouRT's TAKE: KATY SPRINGS &MANJFACTURING, INC. V.
FA VAL ORA
4 3
"The circumstances here involve a factoring arrangement; Haygood and
McChristian did not."'
To date, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals is the only court to directly
examine the effect of medical factoring on personal-injury practice.4" It did
so in the recent Kaoy Springs &Manufacturing Inc. v. Favalora case.4 6
Joseph Favalora was injured while working in a facility owned by Katy
Springs & Manufacturing, Inc.47 Following the injury, Favalora suffered
from chronic neck pain and numbness in his arm.4 8 He underwent epidural
steroid injections and used prescription pain medications before finally
undergoing surgery to fuse his vertebrae.49 At trial, Favalora offered
evidence that twenty-one medical providers billed him a total of
$207,901.59.'0 Favalora testified to owing more than $200,000 in unpaid
medical expenses.
51
Before trial, Favalora entered into contracts with several of his medical
providers under which he assigned to them an interest in any proceeds that
41. Lewis, supra note 29, at 40.
42. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. denied).
43. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. denied).
44. Id. at 603.
45. Outside of Texas, California appellate courts, in dealing with similar "paid or incurred"
statutes, have held that a plaintiff can present and recover the full amount of medical bills owed to a
factoring company when it has purchased a health care company's accounts receivable. See, e.g.,
Katiuzhinsky v. Perry, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1288, 1296-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2007).
46. See Ka i Sptings & Mfg., Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 586 ('This is a personal injury case involving a
worker's compensation nonsubscriber.'D.
47. Id. at 587.
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Id at 605-06.
51. Id. at 602.
[Vol. 48:179
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might be recovered as a result of his pending lawsuit.5 2  Through these
contracts, Favalora also assigned to his medical providers a security interest
in his potential tort recovery.5 3 Afterwards, a medical factoring company
named MedStar Funding purchased, at a discount, the providers' accounts
receivable, including their respective interests in Favalora's potential tort
recovery and the liens on those interests.54
Citing Haygood and Metropolitan Transit Authority v. McChristian,
5 5 a
previous opinion from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Katy Springs
argued that the trial court had erred by admitting evidence of the total
amount billed by Favalora's medical providers rather than the discounted
price at which those bills were sold to MedStar.6 Katy Springs argued that
section 41.0105 limited a plaintiff's recovery "to the amount that the medical
providers have a right to be paid, which, in this case, is the amount for which
MedStar purchased the accounts receivable from the providers."
5
Favalora countered, saying that neither case cited by Katy Springs was
applicable to his situation." Instead, Favalora argued that he was entitled
to recover the full amount billed by his medical providers because he was
contractually obligated to pay that amount to MedStar.
5 9 Essentially, he
argued the existence of Contract B, as described above.
60
The Katy Springs court distinguished Haygood and McChristian on the
grounds that neither one of those cases involved a factoring arrangement.
61
In examining the issue, however, the court found a 2012 opinion out of the
Fifth Court of Appeals to be informative.62  In Big Bird Tree Service v.
Gallegos,63 a manual laborer was injured on the job and underwent multiple
surgeries, including the placement of fifteen screws in his foot.
64 At trial,
the plaintiff offered evidence that his medical providers had billed
$67,699.41 and $16,659.50, respectively.65  Because the plaintiff was
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 603.
55. Metro. Transit Auth. v. McChristian, 449 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.).
56. Kao Springs & Mfg., Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 600.
57. Id. at 601 (emphasis in original).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Lewis, supra note 29, at 40.
61. Kaly Springs &MA., Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 603.
62. Id. at 602.
63. Big Bird Tree Serv. v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
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indigent, however, he received those services free of charge.6 6  At trial,
testimony from the medical providers' custodians of records indicated that
the plaintiff would be required to pay the billed amounts if he recovered for
them in his lawsuit.67 The Gallegos court reasoned that, because the plaintiff
remained liable for the full amount billed if he were to recover those funds,
section 41.0105 did not apply to limit his recovery.68
Along the same lines, the Kafy Springs court determined that, because
Favalora remained liable for the full amount billed, section 41.0105 did not
apply to reduce Favalora's potential recovery.69 The court then turned to
Katy Springs' assertion that Haygood limited any recovery to the amount a
plaintiff was required to '"pay the provider."7 Katy Springs reasoned "that if
the medical provider is no longer entitled to be paid, then the claimant
cannot recover the full amount of the medical expenses from the tortfeasor
but must settle for the, discounted amount received by the provider."7 1
The Kaoy Springs court dismissed this contention out of hand as being in
direct conflict with well-established tenets of Texas common law.72 When
a factoring agreement is at play, a court is not tasked with addressing the
"great disparities between amounts billed and payments accepted."'73
Instead, the court noted there is simply an assignment of rights to collect
the amount billed, and there is no question in Texas that, when a contract is
assigned, the "assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor" and receives the
assignor's full rights.74
IV. WHAT THE OTHER COURTS HAVE SAID
To date, Kaoy Springs is the only appellate opinion to speak directly to the
issue of factoring and the role it plays in determining a plaintiff's possible
recovery. So, while the issue is settled for the time being in one of Houston's
66. Id.
67. Id. at 175-76.
68. Id. at 177.
69. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. denied).




73. Haygood, 356 S.W.3d at 391.
74. Kaoy Springs &Mfg., Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 604 ("Katy Springs' position ignores the longstanding
principle that 'an assignee under Texas common law stands in the shoes of his assignor' [and] [i]n so
doing, the assignee 'receives the full rights of the assignor."') (citations omitted) (first quoting Sw. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Marketing on Hold, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 920 (rex. 2010); and then quoting Jackson v.
Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. 1994)).
[Vol. 48:179
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courts of appeals, the thirteen other courts of appeals have not yet decided
the issue, and of course, stare decisis does not prevent them from
disagreeing with Kao Springs.5
As mentioned above, factoring has been around for a very long time, and
there is no indication that it will die out as a business practice any time in
the foreseeable future. As a result, Ka*y Springs will almost certainly not be
the final word on factoring's effect on personal-injury litigation in general
and section 41.0105's interpretation in particular.7 6 With that in mind, what
follows is a brief review of the applicable case law in each court of appeals.
A. First Court of Appeals (Houston)
The First Court of Appeals came close to considering the effect of
medical factoring companies on section 41.0105 in Huston v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.7 In that case, Sharon Huston was injured when Gabriel Haskin,
a delivery driver for UPS, rear-ended her.78 A medical factoring company,
A/R Net, purchased $240,849.44 of Huston's medical bills for the
discounted price of $81,589.7' Huston entered into an agreement with A/
R Net to pay the full amount billed by her medical providers."0 At trial, the
defense argued that section 41.0105 should limit Huston's recovery to the
amount A/R Net paid to the medical providers, and the trial court agreed.8"
Subject to Huston's objections, the parties stipulated that the total amount
that Huston's medical providers were entitled to was $206,146.62.2 The
jury ultimately awarded Huston $50,000 for past medical expenses.
8 3
On appeal, the issue was hotly contested, and the Texas Trial Lawyers
Association filed an amicus brief in support of reversal.8 4 UPS made an
identical argument to the defense's claim in Kalv Springr "Haygood clearly
limits a plaintiffs recovery to the amount that medicalproviders have a right to
75. See, e.g., Dowell v. Quiroz, 462 S.W.3d 578, 585 n.6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.)
(refusing to follow the decisions of other appellate courts).
76. See Leo Aranda, Note, Structured Settlements: The Assignabiiy Problem, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
465, 465 (2000) (opining factoring companies have threatened the effectiveness of structured
settlements for personal injury victims).
77. Huston v, United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied).
78. Id. at 633.
79. Id. at 635.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 635-36.
82. d at 635.
83. Id at 636.
84. See Texas Trial Lawyers Ass'n, supra note 27, at 1 (supporting reversal of the trial court's
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be paid, which, here, is the amount for which A/R Net purchased the
accounts receivable from the providers."85 The court, however, determined
that any error was harmless, given that the jury only awarded $50,000.86
Though the court avoids explicitly addressing the issue in Huston, its
language indicates that the holding is limited to the facts of the case:
"Huston has not established that the trial court committed reversible error
when it limited the evidence of past medical expenses to the amount that
the medical providers, as opposed to A/R Net, had a legal right to
collect."
87
B. Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth)
The Second Court of Appeals has cited neither section 41.0105 nor
Haygood in a full opinion. In fact, it has cited only one of them-Haygood-
in a memorandum opinion.88 Even then, it was in reference to a plaintiff's
failure to offer any documentary evidence regarding her medical expenses.89
Therefore, it is unclear what the Second Court of Appeals would do if
confronted with a situation like that in Kao Springs.
C. Third Court ofAppeals (Austin)
The Third Court of Appeals has only tangentially touched on topics
relevant to this Article.9 ° In Texas Department of Transportation v. Banda,9
the trial court allowed the plaintiff to admit documentary evidence of the
full amount billed by one of his medical providers even though the medical
85. Huston, 434 S.W.3d at 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (emphasis in
original). Compare id. (emphasis in original) (interpreting Haygood as restricting a plaintiffs recovery of
medical expenses to the amount paid by the factoring company), with Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc., v.
Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 601 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (arguing Haygood
limits recovery for medical expenses to the amounts paid for purchase of accounts receivable from the
medical providers).
86. Huston, 434 S.W.3d at 639.
87. Id.
88. Sutton v. Helwig, No. 02-12-00525-CV, 2013 WL 6046533, at *5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
Nov. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
89. Id.
90. See Kosaka v. Hook & Anchor Marine & Watersports, LLC, No. 03-11-00134-CV, 2012 WL
5476844, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding a judgment is
irreversible on appeal on grounds that the trial court performed an error of law unless the complained-
of error was harmful); Tex. Dep't ofTransp. v. Banda, No. 03-09-00724-CV, 2010 WL 5463857, at *4-
5 (Tex. App-Austin Dec. 22, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (remanding for new trial-due to
insufficient evidence to support damages amount-on all issues, including past medical expenses).
91. Tex. Dep't ofTransp. v. Banda, No. 03-09-00724-CV, 2010 WL 5463857 (Tex. App.-Austin
Dec. 22, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
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provider settled with the plaintiff for a smaller amount before trial.9 2 The
court of appeals reversed on other grounds without addressing the issue.
9 3
In Kosaka v. Hook & Anchor Marine & Watersports, LLC,9 4 the plaintiff
stipulated that his medical providers would accept $44,733.69 as full
payment for the services that had been rendered to him, and he settled his
claim with another defendant for $320,000.9' The plaintiff argued that the
jury improperly awarded zero damages for past medical expenses, but the
court held that any error was harmless, citing section 41.0105 and Haygood
as limiting the plaintiff s recovery to the stipulated $44,733.69 and noting
that the $320,000 settlement credit far exceeded that amount.
96
D. Fourth Court ofAppeals (San Antonio)
Almost five years before Haygood, the Fourth Court of Appeals "h[e]ld
that section 41.0105 limits a plaintiff from recovering medical or health care
expenses that have been adjusted or 'written off.' 97  In a more recent
memorandum opinion interpreting Haygood, the court further explained that,
under section 41.0105, "the plaintiff may only recover the amount of
medical care expenses he actually has to pay."98 This wording is similar to
that used in Kaoy Springs.99
In addition to that similarity, the Fourth Court of Appeals has historically
been aware of the practice of factoring and the effect that its holdings could
have on that practice."0 After determining that a statute had been enacted
to encourage factoring,10 ' the court refused to reach a holding that would
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *6.
94. Kosaka v. Hook & Anchor Marine & Watersports, LLC, No. 03-11-00134-CV, 2012 WL
5476844, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id. at *4-5.
97. Mills v. Fletcher, 229 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
98. VIA Metro. Transit Auth. v. Barraza, No. 04-13-00035-CV, 2013 WL 6255761, at *7 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Dec. 4, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
99. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 603-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) ("This situation, in contrast, involves medical expenses that Favalora is
contractually obligated to pay in full."). Similarly, plaintiffs in California are able to recover the
"reasonable value of medical care and services." Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192, 195 (Ct.
App. 1988).
100. See Scarborough v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 250 S.W.2d 918, 922 (rex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1952, writ ref'd) (claiming a potential "result of compliance with the mechanic's and
materialmen's statutes would be to prevent funds from passing into the hands of the contractor and
thus prevent their being received by the assignee" and such holding would essentially defeat the
purpose of the statute).
101. See id. ("From the wording of the [A]ct itself it appears that its purpose was to encourage
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prevent mechanic's liens from being factored.1" 2 With a few small
revisions, the court's reasoning perfectly mirrors that of Ka_* Springs with
regard to a medical factoring company's rights as the assignee of the medical
providers: "The mechanic's lien statute relates to-the relationship between
the owner, contractor, sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers. They do
not relate to the relationship between a contractor and his assignee."103
E. Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas)
The Fifth Court of Appeals decided the Gallegos case explained above that
was so informative to the Kao Spings court.'0 4 In addition to the brief
description of the case above, the following language from the Gallegos
opinion is relevant here: "Unlike Haygood, there was no evidence of any
contract that would have prohibited [the medical providers] from charging
Gallegos for the full value of the services rendered."'' This statement
references the Medicare contracts lowering the price of Haygood's medical
services,'0 6 but it also implies the effectiveness of Contract B, outlined
above.'0 7 If the absence of a contract reducing medical expenses allows for
the recovery of the full amount billed, then surely the existence of a contract
explicitly requiring payment of the full amount will do the same.
Two additional relevant decisions Out of the same court indicate a more
ambiguous stance.'0 8 In a 2014 memorandum opinion, the court remanded
financing," which is synonymous with factoring. See NOEL RUDDY ET AL., supra note 21, at 7-8.
102. Scarborough, 250 S.W.2d at 922-23.
103. Compare id. at 922 ('The mechanic's lien statute relates to the relationship between the owner,
contractor, sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers. They do not relate to the relationship between
a contractor and his assignee.'), with Kao Springs & Mfg., 476 S.W.3d at 604 ("[By] virtue of the
assignments, MedStar and the medical providers are one and the same for purposes of determining the
admissibility of evidence under [S]ection 41.0105 and Hq~rgood.').
104. Kaly Springs & Mfg., Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 602-03 (citing Galgos to support finding that
evidence of medical expenses paid is admissible irrespective of factoring company's discount purchase
of accounts receivable from the medical providers); see also Big Bird Tree Serv. v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d
173, 177 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
105. Id.
106. Compare Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2011) ("Federal law prohibits
health care providers who agree to treat Medicare patients from charging more than Medicare has
determined to be reasonable.'), with Big Bird Tree Serv., 365 S.W.3d at 177 ("Unlike Hygood, there was
no evidence of any contract that would have prohibited [the medical providers] from charging Gallegos
for the full value of the services rendered.").
107. Lewis, supra note 29, at 40 (asserting the effectiveness of Contract B-between the injured
plaintiff and the factoring company-in allowing non-insured injured parties to recover full medical
expenses by obligating the plaintiff to pay for the full amount of medical expenses-not he reduced
amount paid by the factoring company, thereby recovering the full amount actually paid or incurred).
108. Adley v. Privet, No. 05-12-01581-CV, 2014 WL 3371920 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 9, 2014,
no pet.) (mem. op.); Prabhakar v. Fritzgerald, No. 05-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 3667400 (Tex. App.-
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for a new trial after the trial court admitted three medical bills into evidence
in support of the plaintiff's claim for past medical expenses and the jury
awarded $44,568.07-the total amount claimed by the plaintiff.1" 9 Three
sentences could have broad implications on the present discussion:
[A]t least two of the medical bills Privett submitted as evidence did not
establish the amounts charged by the providers were actually paid or incurred
by or on behalf of Privett. The unadjusted hospital bill shows only what
Privett was billed. Similarly, the PHI Air bill provided no evidence of the
amount actually paid or incurred on behalf of Privett.
110
Though this passage could be interpreted as requiring affirmative
evidence that the amount billed is the amount owed, practitioners would be
better served to interpret the case more narrowly: In addition to the two
above-mentioned medical bills, Privett submitted a third, which indisputably
contained unrecoverable amounts and payments in violation of the collateral
source rule.1"1 After noting that the addition of these unrecoverable costs
could have contributed to the jury's assessment of non-economic damages,
the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.'
12
In a full opinion from 2012 that was not published in the Southwestern
Reporter, the court affirmed a trial court's reduction in damages awarded by
a jury to an amount the parties stipulated was the actual amount paid to the
plaintiff's medical providers.113 In that case, the parties signed a Rule 11
agreement stipulating that (1) the full amount billed by plaintiffs medical
providers was $1,280,041.32; (2) that said amount was reasonable and
necessary; and (3) the actual amount paid to plaintiffs medical providers
was $932,649.42.11' The jury awarded $1,280,000 for past medical
expenses, and the trial court modified the judgment to reduce that award to
the stipulated amount actually paid.'15
F. Sixth Court ofAppeals (Texarkana)
The Sixth Court of Appeals has not had occasion to interpret either
Dallas Aug. 24, 2012, no pet.).
109. Adley, 2014 WL 3371920, at *1.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id. (indicating plaintiff may only recover medical expenses evidenced by actual payment).
112. Id. at *3.
113. Prabhakar, 2012 WL 3667400, at *13-14.
114. Id. at *14.
115. Id. at "13-15. The court actually reduced the award to "an amount six cents less than th[e]
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section 41.0105 or Haygood.
G. Seventh Court of Appeals (Amarillo)
In Henderson v. Spann"6 the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed an issue
similar to that addressed by the Fifth Court of Appeals in Ady v. Privett.1 7
In Henderson, Timothy Wayne Spann was injured in a motor-vehicle accident
and submitted unadjusted medical bills at trial in the amount of
$69,583.20.118 The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of
$54,379.56 in adjustments to those medical bills, but was not allowed to do
SO." 9 On appeal, the court relied on Haygood to hold that the trial court
abused its discretion and committed reversible error by admitting the
unadjusted medical bills while excluding evidence of the adjusted medical
bills. 12  As with Adley, practitioners would be wise to interpret Henderson
narrowly-when evidence of write-offs or adjustments is available,
admission of the unadjusted medical bills is reversible error.
The Seventh Court of Appeals has also held, in a pre-Haygood opinion,
that a debt for medical expenses discharged in bankruptcy is not paid or
incurred for purposes of section 41.0105.121
Defense attorneys who are considering arguing the existence of
Contract C as described above122 should know that the Seventh Court of
Appeals has rejected unsubstantiated claims of such a contract.1 23 Liability
was not at issue in the appeal, but the defendant ook issue with a bill for an
MRI that was presented by the plaintiff in the trial court:
"This $5,400 MRI bill is part of the same chiropractic scam to make the
damages seem higher than they really are. Neither Quintero nor his attorney
is obligated to pay these fees in their full amount, if at all. Pursuant to Civ.
Prac. Rem. Code § 41.0105, Delacerda is only obligated to pay what Qunitero
paid or incurred... If the plaintiffs attorney refuses to disclose this
agreement to the [c]ourt, the [c]ourt should disregard any claimed damages
116. Henderson v. Spann, 367 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, pet. denied).
117. Adley v. Privett, No. 05-.12-01581-CV, 2014 WL 3371920 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 9, 2014,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
118. Henderson, 367 S.W.3d at 302.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 305.
121. Tate v. Hernandez, 280 S.W.3d 534, 536-37 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
122. Lewis, supra note 29, at 40.
123. See Delacerda v. Quintero, No. 07-16-00081-CV, 2016 WL 4702332 (Tex. App.-Amarilo
Sept. 6, 2016, pet. filed) (mer. op.) (citing TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (West 2016)).
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for the medical care."
12 4
This court was puzzled over the meaning of the argument before
dismissing it as waived under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i).
125
"Is [Delacerda] suggesting that Quintero's attorney had some type of
agreement with a chiropractor whereby the chiropractor would prescribe
unnecessary treatment to clients simply to enhance the amount of
recoverable damages?" The court further noted that the record contained
no evidence of such an agreement or scam.26
H. Eighth Court ofAppeals (ElPaso)
The Eighth Court of Appeals has not examined section 41.0105 since
Haygood, and it has never substantively examined the Haygood decision itself.
The court did issue an opinion in 2000 that examined factoring
arrangements in the context of a security agreement and foreclosure sale.
127
Though that opinion examined a situation very different from personal-
injury litigation and was eventually reversed for applying the wrong statute,
it indicates a willingness on the part of the court to uphold the validity of
proper factoring agreements.
1 28
I. Ninth Court ofAppeals (Beaumont)
The Ninth Court of Appeals has not interpreted section 41.0105 or
Haygood. Before the Haygood decision, section 41.0105 was implicated once,
but the court reversed on other grounds and did not reach the issue.
1 2 9
J. Tenth Court of Appeals (Waco)
The Tenth Court of Appeals has cited to Haygood in a memorandum
opinion in support of its application of the collateral source rule.130 Aside
from that, the court has not examined section 41.0105 or Haygood.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Idat *1.
127. See Al Gailani v. Riyad Bank Hous. Agency, 22 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000)
(identifying a case in which the Eighth Court of Appeals briefly reviewed factoring arrangements), rev'd
sub nom. Riyad Bank v. Al Gailani, 61 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2001).
128. See id. at 565 (quoting the official comments on a previous version of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code regarding factoring and refusing to interpret the security agreement at issue to make
it inconsistent with the purposes of the statute as explained in those comments).
129. Christus Health Se. Tex. v. Hall, No. 09-07-074, 2008 WL 2759785, at *7 n.3 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
130. Maddux v. Reid, No. 10-13-00174-CV, 2015 WL 3821153, at *3 (Tex. App.-Waco June 18,
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K. Eleventh Court ofAppeals (Eastland)
The Eleventh Court of Appeals is yet another court that has not yet
examined a case with the benefit of the Haygood opinion's analysis. Prior to
Haygood, however, this court reached the same conclusion:
Section 41.0105 does not provide for the recovery of the amounts initially
incurred by the claimant. To the contrary, it limits the recovery to the
amounts actually incurred by the claimant or his insurer. Amounts that a
health care provider subsequently writes off its bill do not constitute amounts
actually incurred by either the claimant or the claimant's insurer because
neither the claimant nor the insurer will ultimately be liable for paying these
amounts.
131
L. Twelfth Court ofAppeals (yler)
The Twelfth Court of Appeals has not substantively reviewed Haygood,
but it is important to note that it was this court's application of section
41.0105 that was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court in Haygood.1
32
M. Thirteenth Court ofAppeals (Coipus Christi)
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals considered a limited appeal involving
the application of section 41.0105 but decided the case without addressing
that issue.133 More recently, the court has relied on both section 41.0105
and Haygood to refute the argument that a plaintiff may recover only "what
he has paid or is obligated to pay out of pocket.",134 Accordingly, insurance
payments to or for a plaintiff do not reduce his recovery.
1 35
N. Fourteenth Court ofAppeals (Houston)
In addition to Ka_0 Springs, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals also decided
Metropolitan Transit Authority v. McChristian,136 which it distinguished in Kaoy
Springs.13 In that case, Calvin McChristian was injured when a light-rail
131. Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, 288 S.W.3d 471, 481 (Tex. App.-Easdand 2009, no pet.).
132. De Escabedo v. Haygood, 283 S.W.3d 3 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009), affd, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex.
2011).
133. Flores v. Garcia, No. 13-15-00047-CV, 2015 WL 5895087, at *2, *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Oct. 8,2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
134. PHI, Inc. v. LeBlanc, No. 13-14-00097-CV, 2016 WL 747930, at *6-7 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi Feb. 25, 2016 pet. filed) (mem. op.).
135. Id. (citing Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex. 2011)).
136. Metro. Transit Auth. v. McChristian, 449 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2014, no pet.).
137. See Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
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train collided with the bus on which he was riding.1 3 8 At trial, McChristian
offered into evidence medical bills totaling $31,264.99.139 Some of the bills
affirmatively indicated on their face that no adjustments or write-offs had
been made to the billed amounts; others merely showed list prices and did
not indicate either way whether those prices had been subject to any
reductions or reimbursements.140 Records clearly showed that McChristian
was uninsured and his payment method was identified as "self pay."1 41 On
these facts, the court found that "the difficulty highlighted in Hygood" did
not apply, and the trial court properly admitted evidence of the full amount
paid.
142
In another case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected the idea that
contracts between insurance companies and medical providers were
protected by the collateral source rule.143  Its language could broadly be
applied to factoring agreements as well:
Parkan is entitled to discovery of the insurance contracts to aid in determining
whether the providers are required to accept payments of less than the
amounts billed. The record does not reflect that Parkan is attempting to bring
a breach of contract action, nor is he required to do so to be entitled to
discovery of the insurance contracts.144
Under that logic, Contracts A and B-and even the rumored
Contract C-in the example outlined earlier in this Article are all
discoverable.
145
V. THE NEED FOR CLARITY
After the foregoing review of the relevant case law, there are no obvious
signs of a coming split between the courts of appeals on the issue of medical
factoring and how it affects the application of section 41.0105. Only one
Texas court of appeals has so far directly addressed the issue, but several of
its sister courts have indirectly addressed portions of the issue. Of course,
a conflict between courts of appeals is only one reason for the Texas
Dist] 2015, pet. denied) (underscoring that the McChristian opinion was distinguishable because it did
not involve a factoring arrangement).
138. MChnsriian, 449 S.W.3d at 849.
139. Id. at 853.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 853-54.
142. Id. at 854.
143. In reJarvis, 431 S.W.3d 129, 136-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet).
144. Id. at 137.
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Supreme Court to take up a case."' Another is that "the court of appeals
has decided an important question of state law that should be, but has not
been, resolved by the Supreme Court."1 4 7 This latter reason is the one that
should lead the Texas Supreme Court to take up the issue.
Because of the long history of medical factoring in Texas and elsewhere
and the continued tort reform movement, especially in Texas,1 4 8 there is no
question that the issue will re-emerge. And though the simplest and most
effective course of action for the Texas Supreme Court would have been an
affirmation of Kao Springs, that court has denied review of that case. This,
of course, indicates that the Texas Supreme Court "is not satisfied that [Kao'
Springs] has correctly declared the law in all respects" but has found no
reversible error.
14 9
Nevertheless, Ka_0 Springs is the only appellate decision to directly
consider the interplay between medical factoring and section 41.0105. Until
the issue is decided by the Texas Supreme Court, practitioners should pay
close attention to the reasoning laid out in Kaoy Springs. Though the facts of
their own cases may provide grounds for distinguishing Kay Springs,
attorneys who ignore that decision do so at their own peril.
146. See TEx. R. APP. P. 56.1 (identifying "factors the Supreme Court considers in deciding
whether to grant a petition for reviewa').
147. Id. 56.1 (6).
148. See, e.g., Robert M. (Randy) Roach, Jr., The Top Ten Reasons for Hiring an Appellate Spe ahtt in
the Trial Court, HOUS. LAw. at 32, 33 (Sept.-Oct. 2015) ("Over the last few years, the combination of
statutory tort reform and a more conservative Texas Supreme Court has changed some areas of the
law dramatically and some other areas very subtly.").
149. TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(b)(1).
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